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CHAPTER THIRTY-TWO




If Buddhist metaphysics grows out of a concern with explaining the nature of reality –such that gaining an insight into this nature leads to the gradual elimination of confusion
– Buddhist epistemology provides the methodological foundation for pursuing this
pragmatic goal. Two representative figures in particular stand at this defining turn in the 
development of a systematic theory of knowledge within the Indian Buddhist tradition: 
Dignāga (ca. 480–540) and Dharmakīrti (ca. seventh century). A pivotal figure in the 
development of Indian logic and epistemology, Dignāga challenged his contemporaries to 
justify their reliance on scriptural authority and shifted the focus of subsequent 
developments in Indian philosophy from a concern with the aims and rules of debate to an 
investigation of the means by which one may obtain reliable knowledge (pramāṇa). What 
is remarkable is that he accomplished this task, unlike his predecessors, by engaging his 
opponents largely on their own terms. His great successor, Dharmakīrti, would correct, 
defend, and further expand Dignāga’s epistemological project, making original 
contributions of his own and in many ways surpassing his predecessor. Indeed, 
Dharmakīrti’s overarching impact on subsequent generations of philosophers in India and 
beyond is such that he is often taken to represent the standard account of Buddhist 
metaphysics and epistemology. Only Nāgārjuna (ca. 150–250 ce) – and only much later 
with the ascendency of Madhyamaka in Tibet – would come to command a more prominent 
status in the Buddhist philosophical canon.
Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s contributions to what has come to be known as “Buddhist 
epistemology” (sometimes referred in the specialist literature by the Sanskrit neologism 
pramāṇavāda, lit. “doctrine of epistemic warrants”) range from precise accounts of the 
relation between language and conceptual thought to detailed explorations of the content 
and character of experience. Perhaps the most salient aspect of this new (and enduring) 
mode of critical inquiry is its attempt to synthesize a causal account of cognition with the 
dialogical-disputational concerns of validating belief. That is, Buddhist philosophers who 
follow in the footsteps of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti seek to explain cognition in causal 
terms and treat as warranted only that cognition that corresponds to its object and is produced 
in the right way. On this account, then, perceptual judgments of the sort that purport to give 
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us an object as qualified by a certain property, such as blueness (as captured by statements 
such as: “this is blue”) are not treated as warranted instances of perceptual cognition. The 
Buddhist epistemologists thus thematize the old philosophical problem of the difference 
between “seeing” and “seeing as” and contend that only direct and unmediated modes of 
awareness should be counted as instances of warranted perceptual cognition.
It is important to keep in mind that systematic inquiries into the foundations of our 
beliefs are a ubiquitous feature of early Buddhist thought in India. Indeed, seminal 
Abhidharma treatises like the Points of Controversy (Kathāvatthu), which are specifically 
concerned with the rules of argumentation and the various types of debates, catalogue a 
wide range of doctrinal points of dispute (see the chapter by Hayes in this volume). 
Likewise, representative works such as Nāgārjuna’s Dispelling of Disputes 
(Vigrahavyāvartanī), Āryadeva’s One Hundred Verses Treatise (Śataśāstra), and 
Vasubandhu’s Rules of Debate (Vādavidhi) extend this preoccupation with codifying the 
rules of debate to include a range of metaphysical positions insofar as they rely on 
methods of positive argumentation (see the chapter by Gold in this volume). A 
systematic concern with issues that are recognizably epistemological in character (What 
are the sources of knowledge? What are its limits? What are its conditions?), however, 
only emerges with Dignāga. What makes Dignāga’s work (and that of his great 
successor, Dharmakīrti) particularly significant is a willingness to engage with, and 
pursue, philosophical problems that are central to the Sanskritic philosophical 
tradition. One of these central problems concerns the nature and scope of perceptual 
knowledge: that is, what specific type of awareness best captures what it is like to 
perceive, under which aspects a cognition (of this type) may be deemed epistemically 
reliable, and what may one reasonably assert on the basis of such empirical testimony.
Disciplined observation, of the sort that purports to explain the role of consciousness 
and cognition in the acquisition of belief, has always been central to philosophical 
reflection in both India and the West. The notion that a characteristically perceptual mode of 
apprehension actually plays a far greater role in the formation of belief than hitherto 
thought, however, is relatively recent, and reflects seminal advances in the empirical study 
of cognition. What is particularly significant about the Buddhist epistemological project 
is that it provides an account of empirical awareness that is conspicuously modern in 
its outlook. Not only do Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their followers appeal to empirical 
observation as the ultimate source of evidence in explaining the epistemic status of a 
given cognitive event (and, furthermore, justify their position by invoking the Buddha’s 
own reliance on sound reasoning and careful empirical scrutiny); they do so in a way that 
does not overlook the psychological underpinnings of this specific mode of inquiry. If 
achieving practical ends is the goal, then reliance on accurate observations and on an 
understanding of the contextual and dispositional factors that constrain, condition, and 
direct our perceptual and intentional states is crucial.
Buddhist philosophers, like many of their counterparts in the West, realized a long time 
ago that our linguistic and conceptual practices are rooted in pre-predicative modes of 
apprehension that provide implicit access to whatever is immediately present to awareness. 
Indeed, if one fails to perceive the difference between a column of fire and one of dust, to use 
a stock example in the Sanskrit philosophical repertoire, then any inference based on this 
misapprehension will fail to yield reliable knowledge about the event in question. To 
early generations of scholars of Indian and Buddhist philosophy who came under the 
influence of logical positivism, this attempt to tie logical reasoning to observation seemed 
like a typical case of psychologism (that is, of conflating logical reasoning with the 
psychology of perception). Recent advances in the study of perception have demonstrated 
that our reasoning and deliberating practices are 
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grounded in perceptual and nondiscursive process in a far greater measure than most 
philosophers hitherto thought. Though the jury is still out on precisely what specific role 
different perceptual modalities play in grounding belief, these findings appear to vindicate an 
intuition that Buddhist epistemologists share with empiricist philosophers in the tradition of 
John Locke and David Hume, namely that perception is in some sense foundational for 
knowledge. In adopting this largely empiricist outlook, the Buddhist epistemological enterprise 
reflects a growing preoccupation with those types of pragmatic inquiry that alone can lead to 
achieving such desired ends as the elimination of suffering.
This chapter explores one particular aspect of the Buddhist epistemological enterprise: 
the notion that epistemological disputes cannot properly be settled without taking into 
account the particular understanding of the structure of awareness advanced by each school 
of thought. Our approach here is not merely exegetical and historical but descriptive and 
constructive. Its aim is to examine the contributions of Buddhist thinkers to this first-
millennium pan-Indian philosophical conversation about perception and self-awareness in 
ways that also showcase the continuing relevance in contemporary philosophical debates of 
some of the issues with which they engage.
FROM SENSE AWARENESS TO EPISTEMIC 
ASCERTAINMENT
The descriptive analyses of consciousness and cognition found in the vast Abhidharma 
literature provide the foundation upon which Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their successors 
advance their claims to knowledge. The phenomenological stance at work in the Abhidharma 
means that the elements of existence and/or experience (or what the Ābhidharmikas call 
“dharmas”) are examined in such a way that they are never dissociated from the types of 
cognitive events in which they are instantiates. Thus, in the case of sensation, a distinction 
is made between any given sensory modality (say, vision) and the medium that implements 
it (the visual system). The senses are not treated as the instruments of an internal agent or as 
physical organs interacting with empirical objects, but rather as receptacles of experience. 
A distinction is thus observed between the object and its mode of presentation.
Thus, Abhidharma philosophers account for sense experience by reducing it to its 
constitutive elements and processes (see Joseph Walser’s chapter “Abhidharma” in this 
volume). This is the well-known reductionism that is a hallmark of the Abhidharma project, 
with the caveat that the Buddhist reductionist is not an eliminativist. Indeed, the no-self 
doctrine, on this view, is meant to dispel the illusion of permanent, substantive selves, not 
to dispense with any talk of subjective experience altogether. The phenomenological 
reduction at work in the Abhidharma is intended to provide a better account of the subjective 
character of experience, without which identifying and countering unwholesome dispositions 
and cultivating wholesome ones could not be achieved. Take, for instance, the well-known 
canonical account of the principle of dependent arising (pratītya-samutpāda). Things come 
together as a result of a series of mutually sustaining causal relationships: visual 
consciousness thus arises from the coming together of the eye and objects with reflectance 
properties, feeling from the affective and dispositional saliencies that accompany this visual 
experience, perception from this feeling, and so on, leading up to conceptual processes 
where the dependency relation is far less obvious than it is for bare sensory awareness.
What is peculiar about this account of cognitive dynamics is the notion that some type of 
awareness accompanies each sensory modality by virtue of the fact that it arises together 
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with it. In other words, one does not merely see or hear; rather, one sees shapes of a particular 
kind and under specific circumstances. Abhidharma philosophers would eventually come to 
make progressively finer dissociations between different types of cognitive awareness and 
to identify the causal order in which conscious cognitive awareness emerges in the psycho-
physical or pheno-physical domain. Since the mere presence of an object within the range 
of a specific sense modality is not enough for a percept to arise, there must be, so the 
argument goes, an additional element (or step) in the process: attention. Indeed, without 
attentive awareness being directed to a specific region of the perceptual field, it is hard to 
explain how the steady flow of sensory impressions may give rise to a percept. By singling 
out attention as a crucial contributing factor in the emergence of intentional states of 
cognitive awareness, Abhidharma philosophers concede that causation in the physical 
domain can only be understood from the perspective of consciousness, because consciousness 
is indispensable to effecting the changes that an individual engaged on the noble eightfold 
path must undergo in order to make any real progress toward awakening.
Of course, the Abhidharma reductionist project is not limited simply to identifying 
presumably irreducible elements in the causal chain of events, or their constitutive order, 
but extends to the fundamental units of human experience. Breaking down each cognitive 
event to its irreducible constitutive elements holds the key to understanding the most 
fundamental aspects of the human condition. Ultimately, as we have already noted, this 
reductive analysis seeks to map out the mental domain such that afflictive tendencies may 
be properly identified and eradicated. A difficulty arises when we consider that Abhidharma 
philosophers must reconcile the seeming continuance of cognitive awareness with the view 
that phenomena do not endure for more than a moment. Indeed, on the typical Buddhist 
account of the momentariness of all phenomena, visual awareness and visual object are both 
events within an ongoing stream of relations. If the mental domain comprises nothing but 
discrete series of cognitive episodes, how is one to account for appropriation, grasping, and 
recognition? How, that is, does it come to be that the blue sky is for me to see, that it 
happens in my mental series? The causal account of cognition at work in the Abhidharma 
literature thus provides only an incomplete picture of cognitive dynamics, for it cannot 
explain how such episodic cognitive events can effectively sort between an inner and outer 
domain of experience. Even though consciousness itself is but another event in the series of 
dependently arisen phenomena, later Abhidharma thinkers like Vasubandhu would come to 
realize that it stands apart from the other elements in the series as possessing this unique 
capacity to sort through the constitutive elements of experience.
Neither the canonical literature nor the Abhidharma provide detailed and systematic 
accounts of the means by which one can discriminate between veridical and nonveridical 
states of cognitive awareness. As we noted above, works such as the Points of Controversy 
at best identify and sort through a range of views the aim of which is principally that of 
establishing adequate rules of debate. Typically, these debates revolve around issues such 
as whether all knowledge is analytic, whether one can know the minds of others, and 
whether sensations, as mental states, follow one another continuously. Such debates, which 
involve a back-and-forth exchange concerning statements of the sort “Is a b? (“Is knowledge 
analytic?”), most certainly appeal to principles that are discerningly like forms of material 
implication, contraposition, and some version of reductio ad absurdum. These “reasoned 
examinations” (yukti) of controversial points, which are typical examples of what 
philosophers call noneristic dialogues, do not, however, explore the sources of epistemically 
warranted belief in any systematic way.
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THE CONDITIONS FOR PERCEPTUAL 
KNOWLEDGE
Philosophical positions do not arise in a vacuum. Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s 
epistemological project develops in the context of concerted efforts to answer a series of 
challenges: first, from Brahmanical philosophers who doubted that Buddhists had the 
requisite capacity to deploy the methods of investigative reasoning devised by the 
Naiyāyikas, and second, from Buddhist thinkers like Nāgārjuna, whose dialectical stance 
with regard to the nature of reality is that it is inaccessible to thought: although we may form 
useful approximations about how things (or the cognitive events that instantiate them) are, 
these are at best mere conventions and reflect the conceptual practices of a given 
philosophical culture and epoch. Indeed, Nāgārjuna, much like Wittgenstein, invites us to 
abandon the illusions of the knowledge project and come to terms with the view that in 
effect there are no genuine epistemological problems. Since on the view advanced by 
Nāgārjuna and his followers all things are empty of essence or intrinsic existence, they do 
not exist apart from the web of interrelated causes and conditions that instantiate them. The 
emptiness thesis captures not only the condition of entities in the class of what J. L. Austin 
calls “medium-sized dry goods,” but also the character of the mental domain itself. That is, 
no cognition obtains on its own, but itself is the result of multiple causal and conditioning 
factors. On this dialectical stance, we can no more give an account of our subjective 
experience in phenomenologically neutral terms then we can give an account of the 
experienced objectivity (of the things themselves) in physically neutral terms. Reality itself, 
as a concept encompassing the totality of existents that populate any complete ontology, is 
a relational concept and, as such, is subject to the fourfold logical possibilities (A, not A, 
both A and not A, neither A nor not A). Take the example of a conscious awareness 
that, given its association with the capacity to reveal, is examined by drawing an analogy 
with fire. Since, like fire, cognition apparently has the capacity to illuminate, it may be 
assumed that this capacity is something that consciousness awareness possesses 
intrinsically. But just as fire depends on fuel, so also conscious awareness must owe its 
existence (and also its illuminating capacity) to something other than itself.
Unlike Nāgārjuna’s assumption of a dialectical stance, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti adopt 
the methodology of Nyāya philosophers (though not their metaphysical and epistemological 
convictions) and assert that what exists (and how) can actually become an object of both 
empirical scrutiny and conceptual analysis. In other words, for Dignāga and Dharmakīrti 
there is a way that things are that is actually quite different from how they show up to us in 
discerning awareness. As Bimal Krishna Matilal (1986: 26) noted some time ago, there is a 
convergence (indeed, with few exceptions, a coincidence) between the domain of the 
knowables and the domain of “existents.” Nearly all South Asian philosophers who reject 
in some form or another the skeptical position agree upon this much. A problem arises when 
one attempts to establish the number and nature of those sources or instruments by which 
such knowledge is actually obtained.
Traditionally, Indian philosophers have tended to be inclusive and exhaustive in their 
identification of possible sources of knowledge. Apart from perception and inference, 
analogy to a known fact of experience and verbal testimony are also taken to provide 
doxastic types of evidence. For Dignāga, who champions a rather spartan epistemology, 
analogy and verbal testimony are but aspects of inference and do not deserve to be treated 
as separate instruments of knowledge. As he puts it in his now-classic work, the 
Collection on the Sources of Knowledge  (Pramāṇa-samuccaya I, 1):
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The sources of knowledge are perception and inference because the object of cognition 
has only two characteristics. There is no object of cognition other than the particular 
characteristic and the universal characteristic because perception has as its object the 
particular and inference the universal characteristic of the thing (Hattori 1968, 24)
What we encounter here is an attempt to establish epistemology on a neutral ground by 
limiting the evidence to what can be perceptually apprehended. Thus, unlike Nāgārjuna and 
his Mādhyamika followers, Dignāga not only asserts (as most philosophers do) the 
possibility of knowledge, but also specifies the constraints and conditions for the acquisition 
thereof. Thus perception performs its epistemic role not merely by virtue of attending to the 
object at hand, but by doing so under a specific modality that is nonconceptual in character. 
In short, perceptual judgment – by means of which we apprehend an object as the locus of 
a specific quality or as belonging to a given class – is excluded from the domain of warranted 
empirical awareness. Perceiving a cow as a member of a specific mammalian species, or as 
possessing such characteristics as dewlap and so on, is not an instance of veridical 
perception. Perception can only give us the phenomena as directly present to awareness, as 
textures or clusters of sensory experience in a continuum that does not set strict boundaries 
between the world and its apprehension. That is, perception gives us the world as perceived. 
Of course, restricting the domain of perception solely to types of nonconceptual awareness 
raises a problem: how are we to explain perceptual illusions? Furthermore, if in perceiving 
we do not discern the characteristics of objects, then the content of perception cannot form 
an object of conceptual analysis.
Confronted with similar sorts of problems, Nyāya philosophers eventually came to 
define perception as “a cognition generated through the contact between the object and the 
sensory faculty, which is inexpressible, inerrant, and definitive” (Nyāya Sūtra I: 14). Indeed, 
Buddhist philosophers like Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (ca. fourth century) agree with the 
Naiyāyikas that inerrancy is an essential condition for the reliability of empirical awareness: 
how else would one exclude from the domain of perception illusory experiences (like the 
appearance of a circle of fire in a twirling firebrand or a moving tree when running through 
a forest)? Dignāga’s failure to recognize the perceptual basis of certain types of cognitive 
error, and his insistence on attributing all instances of defective perception to higher order 
cognitive process, would eventually meet with strong criticism from his opponents. In his 
magnum opus, the Commentary on the Sources of Knowledge (Pramāṇa-vārttika), which is 
essentially an extensive commentary on Dignāga’s principal work (and which it would 
eventually supplant), Dharmakīrti retains Dignāga’s definition of perception unaltered. 
Only in a later work, the Settling on the Sources of Reliable Cognition (Pramāṇa-viniścaya), 
does Dharmakīrti append the qualifier “nonerroneous” as a condition for the reliability of 
perceptual cognitions. This alteration and the implications thereof for any robust theory 
of perceptual knowledge constitute an important point of debate for subsequent generations 
of Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophers: what precisely does it mean for cognition to be 
nonerroneous (abhrānta)? Should nonerroneous be interpreted to mean nondeceptive, thus 
calling into question the conditions under which a cognition may be said to deviate 
(avyabhicāra) from the object that is immediately present to awareness?
It is true that Dignāga does distinguish between perceptual judgments and pseudo-
perceptions (lumping together cases such as the illusory motion of the river bank when 
floating down a river with conditions like cloudy vision (timira), the apparent perception of 
thread-like fragments in the visual field), but he is not very clear about whether these 
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instances of pseudo-perception are caused by impaired sensory organs or by some kind of 
conceptual misapprehension. Dharmakīrti, however, is less ambivalent. For him cases of 
cloudy vision are unmistakably forms of cognitive impairment.
We have already established that the defining characteristic of Dignāga’s and 
Dharmakīrti’s epistemological project is its thoroughgoing empiricism: indeed, the notion 
that perception – specifically a direct mode of cognitive awareness – can serve as evidential 
ground for knowledge, including knowledge gained by other means (such as inference), is 
central to this project. Of course, in adopting this empirical approach to knowledge, the 
Buddhist epistemologists were not necessarily innovators. Already in the canonical 
literature we come across injunctions that challenge appeals to reason and logical inquiry as 
acceptable pursuits for the Buddhist adept. Rather, as the Buddha urges, one ought to train 
oneself to discern wholesome from unwholesome states of mind and deploy that discernment 
for the purpose of undertaking specific practical tasks. But such discernment is in effect a 
type of cognitive awareness that is essentially perceptual in character. The question arises: 
what could serve as a basis for such discriminating awareness?
Continuing a tradition of analysis with deep roots in the Abhidharma – in this case the 
specifically Sautrāntika Abhidharma position of his teacher Vasubandhu – Dignāga 
identifies a certain state of cognitive awareness that, while lacking in any conceptual 
discrimination, is nonetheless inherently reflexive, as the best type of evidential ground 
there is. Veridical perceptions are thus constitutively self-intimating: that is, they disclose 
both the objective and subjective aspects of cognitive apprehension. Only these instances of 
knowledge intimation can be said to provide access to the domain of unique particulars that 
populate the austere ontology of the Buddhist epistemologist.
Delineating the contours of the perceptual domain and providing a systematic analysis of 
its content are central to any epistemological enterprise. For the Buddhist, and for reasons 
that will be discussed below, mapping out the empirical domain is of the utmost importance. 
Indeed, without some way of differentiating veridical perceptions from, say, perceptual 
illusions or pseudo-perceptions, it would be practically impossible to effectively navigate 
one’s environment or achieve any pragmatic ends. Although the Buddhist epistemologist 
shares with his Brahmanical opponents the view that perceptual awareness necessarily 
involves some kind of contact between the sense and the object or, at the very least, the 
presence of some object (whose ontological status may be ambiguous) before awareness, 
they disagree about both the constitutive character of this perceptual awareness and the 
kinds of objects that it ultimately intends.
On a superficial level one could plausibly argue that the Buddhist epistemologist’s 
definition of perception is informed by his ontological commitments, specifically by the 
stipulation, common to Abhidharma metaphysics, that what should count as the ultimately 
real is whatever can be neither physically nor analytically reduced any further: thus, a 
partless entity. But the Buddhist epistemologist does not deny that partite entities such 
as chariots and forests are real (unlike the antirealist position that Mādhyamika 
philosophers adopt), only that their reality is merely conventional, the result of social 
conventions and common linguistic practices. Why, then, should epistemology be 
pressed into service to defend an ontology of partless atoms (or of indivisible moments of 
consciousness), as demanded by the provisions of Abhidharma metaphysics? This is one 
of the most pervasive criticisms that Buddhist epistemologists must confront, and one 
that leads to a revision of both Abhidharma reductionism and Madhyamaka dialectics.
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To see how Buddhist epistemology (as envisioned by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) meets 
this challenge, let us finally pursue two related questions: first, what do Dignāga’s and 
Dharmakīrti’s analyses of the content of perception tell us about their metaphysical 
commitments? And second, how do Abhidharma descriptions of the structure of awareness 
inform the Buddhist epistemologist’s understanding of the role that this aspect of cognition 
plays in achieving practical ends?
PERCEPTION, SELF-AWARENESS, AND THE 
DUAL-ASPECT THEORY OF MENTAL STATES
How do we know that we know? That is, how, and by what means, are we justified in 
ascertaining that a particular cognitive event, say an instance of perception or judgment, 
counts as knowledge and can lead to successful practice? Furthermore, how do we know 
when we know? How do we know when all the conditions for the reliability of a cognitive 
event have been met such that, for instance, my awareness of a seeming conch shell is 
veridical, or my belief in the impermanence of sound is a true belief? In the first instance, 
my perception is veridical when it is prompted by the appropriate causal and conditional 
factors. In the second, my belief is correct or justified because it is consistent with a set of 
basic beliefs about causality and the emergent character of phenomena. But this manner of 
proceeding merely states the answer without addressing the deeper issue that is at stake in 
the Buddhist epistemological account of cognition: it (viz., cognition) achieves its condition 
of veridicality only insofar as it happens within a given mental series. No epistemic account 
of cognition is complete that does not explain this horizon structure that, among all the 
elements in the chain of dependently arisen phenomena, cognition alone possesses.
As we noted above with regard to the canonical account of dependent arising, things and 
the cognitive events that instantiate them arise together in a mutually sustaining chain of 
causal relationships. Considerations about the direction of the dependency relation apart, 
Buddhist philosophers are quite clear that cognition supervenes on some basis. Disagreements 
only arise with regard to whether this basis should be located in the physical or the mental 
domain. For an Abhidharma philosopher like Saṃghabhadra  (ca. late fourth–early 
fifth century), it is obvious that any alteration in the physical substrate of cognition, say in 
the eye, must elicit an alteration in the quality of the corresponding sense modality, in this 
case of visual experience. The question is: does apperceptive cognition itself, as one of 
five basic modes of cognitive activity, supervene on some more fundamental basis? Or is 
it merely affected by such things as changes in body orientation, the intensity and type of 
the stimulus involved, and other dispositional factors? In other words, where exactly in 
this dynamic process of cognitive emergence do we locate self-awareness? Should 
apperception  be taken to play the function that is assigned to self-awareness, or is it 
rather the case that self-awareness is an aspect of cognition simpliciter rather than another 
(perhaps irreducible) type of cognitive awareness?
Like his predecessors, Dignāga too seems intent on securing an epistemological 
foundation for his analysis of the constitutive elements of existence and/or experience. For 
him the question is not simply (or no longer) what I must know in order to achieve a given 
goal, but rather what specifically are the means for acquiring such knowledge. If attending 
to the unfolding of mental and physical events as they arise is the key to, say, Buddhist 
contemplative practice, then this attending capacity must be assigned a greater epistemic 
role. It is likely that in problematizing empirical knowledge as he does, and in distinguishing 
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between different types of perception (sensory, mental, introspective, and yogic), Dignāga 
is simply extending this Abhidharma quest for the ultimate basis of cognitive activity, 
which eventually he comes to locate in a form of pre-reflective self-awareness 
(svasaṃvedana).
It is an axiomatic principle of Abhidharma philosophy of mind that empirical 
awareness is modality-specific: the content and character of visual experience is different 
from that of feelings, smells, or tastes. It is obvious that content plays an important role 
here: what it is like to encounter objects with reflectance properties is quite different from 
what it is like to come across objects that elicit affective response. Following 
Vasubandhu, the Buddhist epistemologists recognize that cognition has an intentional 
character, that it is in some sense always about an object of its own, whether external or 
internal. But whereas Vasubandhu still sees this mental faculty as the repository of 
ordinary afflictive tendencies – that is, as essentially an afflicted mind (kliṣṭa-mana) 
responsible for perpetuating a sense of oneself as a substantive self – for Dignāga, 
Dharmakīrti, and their successors self-awareness is no longer the mistaken awareness of 
oneself as an enduring locus of awareness, but a fundamental pre-reflective cognitive 
modality. The Buddhist epistemologists thus advance a thesis that is best described as 
reflexivism: roughly, the notion that self-awareness consists in conscious cognitive events 
being inherently self-revealing.
A great deal of Buddhist epistemological reflection in India is concerned with 
explaining the role of this pre-reflective self-awareness in settling disputes about whether 
certain cognitions are intrinsically or extrinsically ascertained. In spelling out the 
conditions of ascertainment, a syncretic Buddhist thinker like Dharmottara (ca. eighth 
century) contends that perceptions of the sort that are associated with achieving practical 
ends may be intrinsically ascertained simply because they are intentionally constituted, 
whereas perceptions that are prompted by some external object are not. Thus, the 
apprehension of fire as having the capacity to burn and cause heat may be intrinsically 
ascertained, whereas the apprehension of its generating causal totality (whether it is 
fuelled by wood or some other flammable substance) is not. But the conditions of 
ascertainment are not the only issues that preoccupy the Buddhist reflexivist. Equal 
attention is given to the emergence and role of the first-person stance. How, asks the 
Buddhist epistemologist, does this primitive or pre-reflective form of self-awareness 
underwrite the activity of conscious awareness we typically associate with the use of 
personal and possessive pronouns such as ‘I’ and ‘mine’? Is this ‘I’ merely a conventional 
designation that does not apply to anything real, as Nāgasena had claimed in his exchange 
with the King Milinda (in the Milinda-pañha)? Is the ‘I’ merely a placeholder or a 
linguistic device that lacks a fixed referent, as the doctrine of no-self would have it? Or is 
it rather the case that this pre-reflective self-awareness is an explanatory primitive, 
without which we cannot make sense of the fact that experience has a specific first-
personal character?
We began our discussion with the observation that one of the defining characteristics of 
the Buddhist epistemological project is reconciliation of analyses of the character of 
cognitive awareness (as inherited from the Abhidharma) with dialogical-disputational needs 
of validating belief. Indeed, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their successors are concerned, in 
true epistemological fashion, not simply with how things and the mental states that 
instantiate them are judged to be (disregarding any account of their mode of presentation), 
but with how things show up to discerning awareness. This specific ability not only to 
attend to the contents of experience but also to reflect upon them (thus to inhabit a 
particular stance) captures a characteristically philosophical orientation. Without this 
orientation there is no view from 534
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somewhere and thus no position to defend. Against the allegedly positionless stance of 
Madhyamaka, the Buddhist epistemologists seek not simply to defend the notion that there 
are real epistemological problems, and effective means for addressing them, but also show 
an (if one may venture to add) honest appreciation for the first-personal stance. Cognitive 
events do not just occur in the mental stream; rather, they present themselves to individual 
subjects of experience as theirs to have or be in them. In effect, by claiming that perceptual 
awareness has this two-aspectual character (involving both an objectual-aspect 
(viṣayābhāsa) and the cognition’s own self-apprehension (svābhāsa), the Buddhist 
epistemologist joins contemporary philosophers like Peter Strawson, who claims that 
statements of the sort that ask whether some inner occurrent experience is mine are 
nonsensical. A person cannot simply feel pain and wonder whether the pain is hers, 
for feeling pain is constitutively something it is like to be in. Pain is not merely an event 
in consciousness, but something that discloses the first-personal character of experience, 
any experience.
Dignāga’s original insight about the subjective character of experience is thus meant to 
capture the specific ways of being that Western existentialist phenomenology refers to as 
being-in-the-world and Abhidharma philosophy terms the phenomenal world of 
experience (loka-saṃjñā.     ). His concern is to provide an explanatory account of those types 
of cognitive events that, while intentionally constituted, are not prompted by the coming 
together of object and attentiveness. Seeing requires that there be objects that are seen 
(under the right conditions of luminescence), but self-awareness, especially for the 
Buddhist who is committed to the no-self doctrine, lacks such anchorage. What most 
Buddhists prior to Dignāga failed to notice (perhaps given doctrinal commitments to the 
no-self view) is the fact that experience is not simply contentful- (that is, it is not simply 
of an object or intentional) but also character-possessing (it has a particular feel, mode of 
disclosure, and horizon structure).
Of course, reclaiming the character of awareness for Buddhist epistemology is not a 
novel enterprise. Dignāga’s approach is mainly concerned with the epistemological 
implications of nonreflexivist accounts of cognition, which he views as vulnerable to the 
problem of infinite regress. If it takes a subsequent instance of awareness to apprehend 
this occurrent cognition, then another instance will be required to know the latter and so 
on. Even assuming that this retrospective awareness of one’s mental states is made 
possible by a special type of recognition (as a cognition occurring after a cognition of the 
same type), this could not explain why this sort of cognition emerges at all, and why in 
one mental stream and not another. Dignāga’s defense of the reflexivity thesis is also 
meant to counter what he essentially regards as the regressive character of representational 
or higher-order theories of consciousness.
CONCLUSION: INTENTIONALITY AND THE 
STRUCTURE OF EXPERIENCE
The dual-aspect theory of mental states that Dignāga advances (much like its Western 
endorsement by philosophers like Brentano and Sartre) is meant to capture this notion that 
cognition’s intentional content (its object directedness) cannot be accounted for without 
its subjective aspect, without reference to its mode of presentation. Thus, Dignāga states: 
“That cognition has two aspects is [known] from the difference between the cognition of 
the object and the cognition of that [cognition]” (Pramāṇa-samuccaya I.11ab). In other 
words, mental events such as perceiving, judging, or remembering cannot be distinguished 
as such only on the basis of the objects they intend: a physical entity of some kind, a 
concept or a 
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past experience. Without cognition’s self-intimating aspect – that is, without this implicitly 
self-aware aspect of cognition – one could not tell the difference between perception and 
conception or judgment and desire. How are we to account for Dignāga’s position on the 
subjective aspect of experience?
One possibility is to adopt the intentionalist stance and state that the subjective aspect 
captures the content of one’s experience as the perspectival stance from which it is an 
experience of a particular type of world-presenting content. This interpretation avoids 
collapsing Dignāga’s subjective aspect of cognition into an account of the character of 
experience as evinced by locutions of the “what it is like” type. But this move comes at the 
heavy cost of sacrificing the feasibility of the first-personal account of experience. Even 
assuming that the subjective aspect is nothing but the mode of presentation of an intentional 
mental state, it cannot explain why the content in question is object-directed rather than 
subject-directed. It is noncontroversial for both Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophers 
that cognitions are intentionally constituted, that they are about an object of their own 
(saviṣayaka). But just because the mode of presentations of cognitions is itself intentionally 
constituted does not mean that cognition can be explained entirely in terms of its intentional 
content. An interpretation of the dual-aspect theory of mental states that reduces intentionality 
to the various aspects of a mental state’s intentional content in effect reduces intentionality 
to a function that cognition has, namely that of aboutness. As such it faces the same problem 
of infinite regress that confronts higher-order or representationalist theories of cognition.
Another possibility – and one more likely to capture the intent of Dignāga’s 
epistemological stance on self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) – is that the dual-aspect theory of 
mental states is meant to capture both the phenomenal content (viṣaya-ākāra) and the 
phenomenal character (jñāna-ākāra) of experience. On this latter interpretation, the dual-
aspect theory captures both the content and the horizon structure of awareness (or its 
perspectival outlook).
The principle of momentariness posed a challenge to Abhidharma philosophers 
concerned with explaining the sense of recollection that accompanies each mental series: if 
discrete and episodic events are all there is to have a mind and be conscious, how do 
grasping and appropriation occur? The causal account of cognition at work in the 
Abhidharma, it seems, offers only an incomplete picture of the mental domain. While 
vijñāna, the Sanskrit term typically translated as “consciousness,” conveys a sense both of 
differentiation and of discernment (between mental states and their types), the problem of 
how one comes to sort between an inner and outer domain of experience remains 
unexplained.
Reclaiming the subjective character of experience is thus indispensable to any robust 
account of cognition, its mode of ascertainment, and its epistemic status. Whether or not the 
reflexivity thesis advances the Buddhist epistemological account of perception and self-
awareness in a fruitful direction is a subject of much debate among Dignāga’s and 
Dharmakīrti’s Indian and Tibetan interpreters. What is less controversial is that, following 
Dharmakīrti, the attempt to reposition the debate about the phenomenal qualities of 
experience in terms of relations between the aspects of cognition can no longer proceed 
without making fundamental assumptions about the character of experience.
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